In this paper we adapt a dynamic discrete choice model to examine the aggregated demand for single-and multi-year crop insurance contracts. We show that in a competitive insurance market with heterogeneous risk averse farmers, there is simultaneous demand for both insurance contracts. Moreover, the introduction of multi-year contracts enhances the market penetration of insurance products. Using U.S. corn yield data, we empirically assess the potential of multi-year crop insurance.
Introduction
There is ample empirical evidence that traditional crop insurance does not attract high participation of producers without financial subsidies. In the U.S., for example, more than 60% of the total premiums paid by farmers are subsidized. In total, costs for the federal crop insurance program add up to $10 billion annually (Goodwin and Smith, 2013) . These figures imply that for most developing countries, traditional crop insurance would not be fiscally feasible. In light of considerable expenses for subsidizing traditional crop insurance programs, low participation for unsubsidized insurance and growing risk exposure due to climatic change, there is an urgent need for alternative crop insurance products which are affordable.
Several alternative insurance instruments have been discussed in the literature, such as area yield insurance or weather derivatives (Mahul, 1999; Vedenov and Barnett, 2004) . Another 1 alternative, which has recently been proposed by Chen and Goodwin (2010) , is multi-year crop insurance. Multi-year insurance, also known as long-term insurance, is offered at a fixed premium per year and has a contract period of more than one year. In contrast to single year insurance, it is not possible to raise the premium or to cancel the contract during the contract period. Apart from allowing stable premiums, multi-year insurance can also reduce administrative costs related to marketing and renewal of insurance contracts (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2009) . A further advantage, cited by Chen and Goodwin (2010) , is that fair premiums of multi-year crop insurance are smaller than that of single-year contracts, unless crop yields are perfectly correlated over time. This feature rests on a time diversification argument, i.e., payoffs are pooled across time. A necessary condition for time diversification, however, is that all indemnity payments are granted at the end of the contract period. It is likely that this feature makes multi-year contracts less attractive to farmers because they may suffer liquidity problems before they receive indemnity payments. If, in contrast, indemnities are paid immediately in case of a yield loss, multi-year insurance is likely to be more expensive since the insurance provider must be compensated for losing the flexibility of premium adjustments. The question arises as to whether multi-year crop insurance is still attractive for farmers and insurance providers under these conditions.
To answer this question, we develop a dynamic choice model of insurance alternatives, in which single-and multi-year insurance contracts are offered to heterogeneous risk averse farmers. Based on an inter-temporal utility function, we derive the aggregated demand for single-and multi-year insurance contracts. The theoretical model is then calibrated to U.S. corn yields.
2 Theoretical framework 2.1 Insurance market Following Kleindorfer et al. (2012) , we consider the simplest non-trivial setting, a two-period two-state model with complete information. We introduce an insurance market in which insurance premiums reflect the expected loss plus a risk loading factor which mainly represents the reinsurance cost. That is, premiums are exogenously given and not determined by an equilibrium model. Risk loading (denoted as 1 ) at 1 is known, while the loading factor 2 at 2 is uncertain and depends on the state of the world, ∈ { , }. It either increases to 2 with probability or decreases to 2 with probability (1 − ) depending on a loss occurrence at 1 . Thus, 2 ≤ 1 ≤ 2 .
(1)
The assumption of time varying risk premiums is plausible since they will be likely adjusted when new information on realized losses becomes available. In fact, crop insurance premiums in the U.S. were subject to changes in recent years (Risk Management Agency, 2012) .
We focus on a specific type of crop insurance, namely area yield insurance. This is an index-based insurance where individual indemnity payments depend on the average yield in a region rather than on individual farm yields. This type of insurance is not subject to moral hazard and loss adjustment, and thus bypasses obstacles inherent to traditional crop insurance (Mahul, 1999) . Several index insurance programs have been implemented all over the world, particularly in developing countries, such as India, Bangladesh, Mexico, and China. The relation between individual farm yields, ( ) =1,…, and the area yield is assumed as:
The coefficient measures the sensitivity of the individual yield to the area yield. It determines the risk reduction potential and, in turn, the optimal coverage level of area yield insurance (Mahul, 1999 ). In our model, is a crucial parameter because it allows us to introduce heterogeneity of farmers. An empirical distribution of was estimated by Miranda (1991) . He finds that this parameter varies from 0.1 to 2.03 for U.S. bean producers. ℬ represents the set of heterogeneous farmers with different , i.e., ∈ ℬ. ( ̅ ) denotes a function counting for the number of farmers with < ̅ .
Two types of area yield insurances policies are provided: single-year contracts (SY) and multi-year contracts (MY). The indemnity payment for both contracts is: = max{ − , 0}
paid after each period, where is the realized area yield at and is a trigger value. MY contracts have a fixed annual premium 4F
1 . The price of SY contracts at 1 is ,1 and is known, but ,2 at 2 can either increase to ,2 or decrease to ,2 depending on the level of reinsurance costs. Formally stated:
From Eq. (1), it follows that ,2 ≤ ,1 ≤ ,2 . We assume that the insurance premium increases, on average, due to climate change, i.e., ,2 + (1 − ) ,2 ≥ ,1 . Moreover, it is assumed that: ≥ ,1 because insurers have to be compensated for bearing the risk of fluctuating reinsurance costs.
2 Note that although MY is more expensive than SY, risk averse farmers might prefer MY to avoid price uncertainty.
Modeling farmers' insurance choices
Farmers are assumed to have an additive inter-temporal utility = 1 + 2 where (⋅) is a one-period utility function depending on net incomes at 1 and 2 , respectively. 3 Given Eq. (2), the expected utility of purchasing an insurance contract in one period is:
and the expected utility without an insurance contract is:
Farmers face a discrete choice set consisting of buying MY or SY, or choosing no insurance (NI) for two periods (Fig. 1) .
Fig. 1 Farmers' insurance choices
2 A&O cost, which are probably smaller for MY than for SY, are not taken into account. 3 We ignore discounting of utility at 2 . We solve the decision problem via dynamic programming. The decision rule of farmer 2 ( , ) at 2 follows:
Farmers who buy MY at 1 , hold MY also at 2 by definition. Otherwise, they decide to buy SY or NI based on their expected utility at each state of the world . At 1 , the optimal choice set 1 ( ) is:
The optimal decision 1 ( ) for farmer satisfies:
To determine the aggregated demand 1 ( ) for insurance contracts, we introduce the indicator function and define the aggregated demand for ∈ {MY, SY, NI} at 1 and 2 as:
When MY and SY are both offered in the insurance market, the total expected insurance demand for both periods is:
If only SY is offered, the total expected insurance demand for both periods equals:
Solution
In this section, we derive the optimal insurance type for each farmer as a function of the hedging effectiveness . We strive for a closed form solution and throughout there are two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume an exponential utility function ( ) = −exp(− ) 
where
Φ(⋅) is standard normal CDF, = � ,min , ,max , 0, � , 1 = (0, , , ) , and 2 = ( , max , , ). Similarly, Eq. (6) becomes
where 0 = (0, max , , ).
In a first step, we examine a situation where only SY is available. Given ∈ { ,1 , ,2 , ,2 }, a farmer chooses SY only if E (− , ) ≥ E (0, ). Inserting Eq. (13) and (15), this inequality becomes:
Solving for yields:
where = log( 1 / 0 ) + − + 2 2 /2. Thus, the critical s for farmers to choose SY at 2 and 1 are:
and
Note that a critical exists only if 
Eq. (20) holds if:
Eq. (21) 
Similarly, we obtain:
According to Eq. (23), farmers with ≤ < ,2, choose MY whereas farmers with ,1 ≤ < prefer SY at 1 and also at 2 given that = ,2 . Table 1 summarizes the optimal decision space as a function of the hedging effectiveness . Note that farmers with ≥ exchange SY for MY when it is offered. As a result, the total expected insurance participation increases because farmers with ≤ < ,2, hold MY instead of NI at 
PROPOSITION 2.1 (i) The expected total demand with MY and SY is greater or equal to that with only SY, i.e.,
which holds under Eq. (21). Thus, ( ) ≤ ( ,2, ) completes the proof.
(ii) Demand variances at 2 are:
The assertion follows from ( ) ≤ ( ,2, ).
We conclude that the introduction of MY can, in fact, increase and stabilize insurance participation provided that potential buyers of insurance are sufficiently heterogeneous.
Illustration for U.S. Corn Producers
In this section, we illustrate how multi-year area yield insurances might perform for U.S. corn producers. Due to the lack of individual farm data, we use county-level corn yield data and consider these as representative corn producers. Area yields are at the state-level. 4 The annual . The strike value is defined as the 30% quantile of . The probability of = is assumed to be 0.5 as in Kleindorfer et al. (2012) . Risk loading in the first period, 1 , is 0.1, which follows Group Risk Plan's actual rating procedure in the U.S. (Deng et al., 2007) . Finally, we assume that the insurance premiums in the second period either increase or decrease by 20%. 6 These specifications are the same for all considered states, however, the insurance premiums or and critical s vary across states depending on the average corn yields of each state. 
Conclusion
This paper investigated if farmers' participation in private, unsubsidized crop insurance can be increased by offering multi-year insurance contracts with stable insurance premiums in addition to single-year insurance contracts. By means of a dynamic choice model, we show that there is a demand for multi-year insurance and that both types of insurances can co-exist. In contrast to previous studies, this result is not based on a time diversification argument. Moreover, we show that the total expected insurance participation increases when both insurance contracts are offered to farmers, i.e., the introduction of multi-year insurance contracts enhances the market penetration of insurance products. It turned out that this effect is moderate when applying the model to U.S. corn production. In practice, however, the increase of insurance demand could be more pronounced because we did not consider marketing and administrative costs and thus ignore this cost reduction potential of multi-year insurance.
